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was chaired by the new President
of the GICHD Council of Foundation (the Geneva Centre’s governing
body), Dr. Barbara Haering. The discussion opened by emphasizing that
landmines, ERW and small arms/
light weapons are all tools of armed
violence that negatively affect lives
and livelihoods after conflict.
Mine action can make a significant contribution to programs focused on armed-violence reduction,
peace building, security-sector reform, and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of
former combatants. The panelists
discussed the experience of mineaction organizations in dealing with
the legacy of ERW as part of efforts
to strengthen human security and
promote reconstruction and development. Further details on the workshop can be found on the Linking
Mine Action and Development pages
of the GICHD Web site.1

tation on mine and ERW action
accessible in French.2 The materials
on the Bibliomines Web site include
the following:
· Documents from mine-affected
countries
· Documents from international
institutions
· Conventions and texts of international law
· Documents developed for
national implementation (legislations, strategies, national
standards, procedures, programs, etc.) studies, surveys,
publications, etc.2
In addition to facilitating access
to mine-action-related documents
in French, Bibliomines promotes the
production and dissemination of
new documents and creates opportunities for cross-sectoral exchanges
of expertise.2 The Bibliomines Web
site can be accessed via the GICHD
Web site or at www.bibliomines.org.

Bibliomines

Recent Publications

The GICHD is collaborating
with the national mine-action centers of Senegal (Centre National
d’Action Antimines du Sénégal) and
Mauritania (Programme National
de Déminage Humanitaire pour le
Développement) and the mine-action
training center of Benin (Centre de
Perfectionnement aux Actions postconflictuelles de Déminage et Dépollution) to carry out the Bibliomines
project. The Bibliomines online library was created for French-speaking communities affected by mines
and ERW, and for national actors
within mine action. The library collects and makes existing documen-

Recent publications from the
GICHD include an updated version
of the Guide to Cluster Munitions,3
the first edition was published in
November 2007. This guide presents
some content of the Convention on
Cluster Munitions and information
on stockpile destruction, while offering new findings in procedures
for survey and battle-area clearance. Another recent GICHD publication is the Guide to Mechanical
Demining Handbook.4 A full list
of all GICHD publications can be
found at http://www.gichd.org/
gichd-publications/overview.
See Endnotes, Page 78
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IEDs: A Major Threat for a
Struggling Society
The use of improvised explosive devices by guerrillas, drug cartels and paramilitary
groups has threatened Colombian society for the past 30 years. This article examines
the types of IEDs found in Colombia, and the extent and history of its IED problem. Also
outlined are the Colombian government’s efforts to counter IEDs, and possible soluIan Mansfield is the Deputy Director
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tions to the challenges ahead, such as enhanced intelligence and community security.

by Pablo Esteban Parra Gallego [ PAICMA ]

C

olombia, located in the northern tip of
South America, is the country in the
Western Hemisphere most affected by
improvised explosive devices. Its level of contamination is comparable to countries like wartorn Iraq and Afghanistan, where international
forces deem IEDs a major threat to their plans
and to the security of their personnel.

Improvised landmine, pressure activated.
ALL PHOTOS COURTESY OF EJÉRCITO DE COLOMBIA—ESCUELA DE INGENIEROS
MILITARES

Types of IEDs Found in Colombia

There are few conventional landmines
found in Colombia. Instead, landmines are
generally improvised explosive devices used
as anti-personnel landmines (that is, victimactivated). An IED1 is a bomb fabricated in an

improvised manner that incorporates destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic or incendiary
chemicals. IEDs are designed to destroy or incapacitate personnel or vehicles. In Colombia,
these devices were used recently to counter the
advance of the Colombian Armed Forces during
their struggle to eliminate illegal groups in the
country. These groups also use IEDs to protect
coca crops, and to frighten the population that
may collaborate with the government forces.2
Most of the IEDs produced in Colombia fall
into one of the following categories:
1. House-borne IEDs: Devices in any kind
of building, rigged to detonate and cause
collapse shortly after a military unit enters.
These IEDs have become very popular to
attack bomb/explosives clearance squads
and specialized anti-terrorism teams.
2. Vehicle-borne IEDs: Devices that use a
vehicle as the package or container of the
IED. They come in all shapes, colors and
sizes, depending on the type of vehicles
available. Donkey-drawn carts, bicycles,
motorcycles and ambulances have also
been used in attacks on Colombian
Armed Forces. Their destructive power
relies on the quantity of explosives and
the amount of shrapnel generated during
the detonation.
3. Booby traps: IEDs contained in a variety
of objects like cell phones, radios, balls,
cooking pots and even corpses. They are
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designed to detonate when an unsuspecting victim touches or disturbs the
seemingly harmless object. They can
also be activated by a remote control or
a timing mechanism.
4. Anti-personnel mines: IEDs using plastic, glass or metallic containers, with different amounts of explosives, different
kinds of shrapnel-generating objects, and
concurrent activation systems. Designed
to detonate with contact by or proximity to its victim, they are concealed in
the ground or in vegetation. The most
sophisticated anti-personnel mines are
undetectable by metal detectors and have
chemical-activation systems that can
last for many years. Since a single victim
can activate most roadside IEDs, they
are classified as AP mines and known as
victim-activated IEDs—unless they have
a remote-controlled activation system.
5. Improvised land-service ammunition:
The pressure Colombian Armed Forces
exerted on illegal armed groups closed
most of these organizations’ access to
weapons markets, forcing them to forge
most of their land-service ammunition.

Numerous explosive devices found by the
Colombian Army.

Improvised projectiles, mortars, rockets,
grenades and remote-controlled roadside
charges were devised; many have serious
reliability and aiming problems.
Materials Used and How IEDs Work

IEDs typically consist of a main charge, a
booster, a detonator and an initiation system.
Depending on their objective, IEDs in Colombia

50

special report | the journal of ERW and mine action | fall 2009 | 13.3

are built in different shapes and sizes, with varied materials and activation devices. IEDs can
act just by the power of the detonation (blast),
but most of the time they contain multiple kinds

IED found on a boat that was planned to be used
in a river attack.

of shrapnel, and evidence suggests that chemical
or biological toxic elements are sometimes added to enhance the damage to victims. Depending on the IED’s purpose, sometimes the builder
adds a shaped charge to defeat armor, but most of
the time, IEDs in Colombia are designed as antipersonnel landmines. IEDs that are meant to destroy armored vehicles or buildings are shaped to
focus the effect of the explosive’s energy, mainly to create more damage to a highly resistant
object. When an IED is built in a shape-charge
manner, it is most likely anti-vehicle and not AP.
Each IED found in Colombia is unique because
its producer uses only locally available materials. Since they are tailored for a specific objective,
IEDs are usually more difficult to prevent, detect
and neutralize than regular ammunition.
IEDs built by inexperienced people or with
defective materials can fail to accomplish their
task. Illegal groups in Colombia, however, have
developed advanced techniques, employing
sophisticated elements of conventional ammunition that make IEDs more reliable and lethal,
including electronic components, cell phones,
remote controls, and magnetic and optical fuzes. The complexity of IEDs is only limited by the
training and creativity of the designer and by
the availability of specific materials.

IED builders usually rely on the container
of the device for fragmentation purposes. A
detonated car bomb will have a devastating effect resulting from the pieces of the car itself
flying at high speed. Nevertheless, IEDs have
been found with added shrapnel, like nails and
bolts, to inflict worse damage. To avoid metaldetector discovery of improvised landmines,
illegal groups in Colombia avoid metallic materials, instead adding glass and plastic for
fragmentation effect. At first, landmine victims suffer wounds from the explosion, and
later develop infections from fragments that
weren’t detected by X-rays.
Due to logistical constraints of illegal
groups, their IEDs seldom contain military
explosives. They are more often built with
ammonium nitrate and fuel oil (ANFO) or
other types of improvised explosives, which
widely affect their destruction capability.
Allegedly, several products, like coffee or
paint, are added to those explosives to avoid
canine detection. Most components of IEDs
are relatively easy to find in rural markets.
IEDs in Colombia commonly have a powerful

pounds) of explosives, but some have been
found to hold more than 20 kilograms (44
pounds) of explosives.
The most common type of detonator found
in Colombia is the electrical detonator, although non-electrical and chemical detonators
have also been found. The latter are commonly
used in landmines to avoid detection by metal
detectors and weathering of the batteries. Further studies are needed, but evidence indicates
that battery-initiated landmines decay after
just months in the open. Similarly, the hygroscopic nature of ammonium nitrate and defects
in the waterproofing of IEDs generally render
ANFO ineffective after being abandoned for
several months.
Activation mechanisms vary widely, depending on the type of IED. Car bombs and
house bombs usually have a mixture of timers, remote controls and victim-activated fuzes. The nature of the objective, the amount of
resources spent and the risk inherent to the activity oblige the designers to use more sophisticated and reliable activation systems. Booby
traps generally have a victim-activated system,
but some are also activated by a simple remotecontrol device. IED landmines are all victimactivated with pressure-release, tension, or
tension-release systems. Depending on their
strategic purpose, these landmines can have
several initiation systems, including magnetic
and photosensitive fuzes.
How did Colombia Become so Affected?

Gas cylinder filled with explosives, used to boobytrap a building.

main charge, causing significant damage
and terrorizing the population. This scenario
is particularly true with improvised landmines because these devices use containers, including bottles or boxes, that can hold
more explosives than regular mine casings.
AP landmines in Colombia usually hold 250
grams (0.5 pound) to 4,000 grams (nearly 9

After Colombia won its independence from
Spain in the beginning of the 19th century, rural violence became widespread throughout the
country, the result of unfair land distribution,
frail property rights and obscure political interests. From the second half of the 20th century until today, leftist guerrillas—mainly the Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia or FARC) and
the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army or ELN)3—have ravaged the country;
and since the 1980s, drug cartels and paramilitary
self-defense groups have only added to the level of
violence in this already complicated setting.

13.3 | fall 2009 | the journal of ERW and mine action | special report

51

Most of the drug cartels, guerrillas and
paramilitary groups began using IEDs in Colombia during the 1980s and 1990s. During
that time period, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (known
as ETA or Basque Homeland and Freedom),4
Irish Republican Army5 and other terrorist
groups came to Colombia to train FARC and
ELN members in the construction and use of
IEDs. But over the years, FARC and ELN had
already developed a state-of-the-art technique that allows them to build and utilize
an ever-expanding number of IEDs to disrupt Colombian State Forces and intimidate
the population.
Over the past 30 years, illegal groups acting
in Colombia have used all kinds of IEDs, from
the car bombs commonly used in the past by the
Medellín Cartel led by Pablo Escobar, to improvised rockets, grenades, mortars, explosivefilled gas cylinders, booby traps, roadside
explosives and even donkey-bombs. Victimactivated IEDs have killed or maimed over
8,000 civilian and military Colombians, both
(victims of other IEDs are still being counted), and the national economy has suffered
enormous losses in trade and infrastructure.
The abundant use of IEDs and other indiscriminate weapons by FARC and ELN contributed to the decision by the United States,
the European Union and several other countries to classify the two organizations as terrorists groups. 6,7
Scope of the Problem

Between 2002 and 2007, 5,200 terrorist acts involving various IEDs took place in
Colombia. Though the number of bombings
saw an 81-percent reduction during that period, the use of IEDs is still relevant. Despite
the efforts of Colombian Armed Forces, illegal groups successfully executed 347 terrorist
acts involving IEDs in 2008, and 178 during
the first six months of 2009.8
Most of these IEDs were used against the
Colombian Armed Forces by means of roadside charges, car bombs and booby-trapped
buildings. Some were used against key infrastructure throughout the country, like pipe-
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lines (734 bombings) and power lines (1,713
bombings), 8 affecting the national economy.
Others were used against civilian targets, or
affected the civilian population due to their
indiscriminant nature, similar to the attack
with gas cylinders on the church of Bojayá
(2 May 2002), where 119 civilians lost their
lives, or the bombing of the social club El
Nogal (7 February 2003), where 36 died and
more than 200 were wounded.
Additionally, FARC and ELN also use victimactivated IEDs, effectively making them landmines. Between 1990 and 1 July 2009, there
were 4,289 landmine accidents in Colombia,
causing death or injury to 7,428 people, 34 percent of which were civilians.9
During this same period, 471 municipalities of Colombia (43 percent) reported at least
one landmine victim to the Programa Presidencial para la Acción Integral contra Minas
Antipersonal (Presidential Program for Mine
Action or PAICMA).9
Due to the intensive use of improvised
anti-personnel mines by FARC and ELN in rural areas of the country, landmine accidents increased almost 900 percent between 2000 and
2006. Even though the number of landmine
casualties started to diminish in 2007, the current number of victims killed or injured by these
devices in Colombia is still one of the highest in
the world. The use of landmines in Colombia by
FARC and ELN poses a huge threat to people,
hinders social and economic development, impedes the use of natural resources and causes
displacement of communities.
National Measures Against IEDs

The social and economic losses due to
the extended use of IEDs by illegal groups
in Colombia are so large they are nearly
incomprehensible. Colombia’s legislation
contemplates strong penalties against IED
producers, but the economic incentives
from the drug business run by the illegal
armed groups are too high, spurring their
use against the Colombian Forces.
Colombian Armed Forces have increased
their training, along with research-and-

development efforts on new detection, neutralization and destruction techniques. Special
teams have been formed and trained in the
techniques to counter IEDs, but the race between new production technologies and countermeasures is never-ending.
The National Army of Colombia alone
has more than 1,200 rapid-response teams
trained for breaching operations during combat. This capacity is often used to counter
IEDs and mitigate the risk for affected communities. Seven other teams have received
training in IED neutralization and deal with
more complex threats in urban areas. The
Colombian National Police and Colombia’s
security agencies have also developed similar
teams, providing the country with a substantial counter-IED capacity.
Better security conditions in several parts
of the country facilitate the return of internally displaced people who were forced to
leave their homes by the illegal groups when
the groups emplaced landmines. To support
these communities calling for a definitive
solution to their problem with IEDs, special
humanitarian-demining teams from the National Army have been trained and equipped.
Using International Mine Action Standards,
mine clearance is taking place, making many
areas safe again. In coordination with the
national mine-action authority, the government is considering allowing experienced
landmine-clearance organizations to implement clearance programs in Colombia.
As a result of these efforts in 2008, the following were detected and destroyed:
• 17,353 IEDs
• Six car bombs
• 1,431 gas cylinders filled with explosives
• 108,197 kilograms (238,534 pounds) of
explosives
• 97,174 detonators
• 105,306 meters (65 miles) of detonating cord
• 22,736 meters (14 miles) of safety fuze.10
During this same year, the humanitariandemining teams cleared 174,752 square meters
(43 acres) and destroyed 447 landmines and 21
pieces of unexploded ordnance.

More Work to be Done

More and better intelligence must supplement the national capacity to counter IEDs. Information is the key issue in the fight against
terrorist attacks and minefields. It is as important for the prevention of the use of new IEDs
as it is for finding, neutralizing and destroying
the ones already in the ground. The government is already working on this issue, with the
cooperation and technical assistance of several
allied countries.
An international advocacy campaign
against the use of indiscriminate weapons by
illegal armed groups in Colombia will soon be
implemented. Regardless of its size, technology and budget, no national counter-IED capacity is enough to stop the losses caused by
these weapons. Iraq and Afghanistan are clear
examples of this statement. Perhaps the Second Review Conference of the Ottawa Convention, to be held 30 November–4 December
2009 in Cartagena, Colombia, will send a clear
message to FARC and ELN to stop using landmines, and to reduce the use of IEDs against
the people of Colombia.
See Endnotes, Page 78
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